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MULTIPERSON UTILITY
By Manel Baucells and Lloyd S. Shapley1
Abstract: We approach the problem of preference aggregation by endowing both
individuals and coalitions with partially-ordered or incomplete cardinal preferences.
Consistency across preferences for coalitions comes in the form of the Extended
Pareto Rule: if two disjoint coalitions A and B prefer x to y, then so does the
coalition A [B. The Extended Pareto Rule has important consequences for the
social aggregation of individual preferences. Restricting attention to the case of
complete individual preferences, and assuming complete preferences for some pairs
of agents (interpersonal comparisons of utility units), we discover that the Extended
Pareto Rule imposes a “no arbitrage” condition in the terms of utility comparison
between agents. Furthermore, if all the individuals and pairs have complete
preferences and certain non-degeneracy conditions are met, then we witness the
emergence of a complete preference ordering for coalitions of all sizes. The
corresponding utilities are a weighted sum of individual utilities, with the n ¡ 1
independent weights obtained from the preferences of n ¡ 1 pairs forming a
spanning tree in the group.
Keywords: Preference aggregation, Incomplete preferences, Extended Pareto
Rule.
1 Introduction
Our approach to the problem of preference aggregation begins by en-
dowing coalitions with cardinal preference orderings that may fail to be complete,
i.e., some pairs of outcomes may be regarded as incomparable. We then consider a
natural extension of the Pareto Rule, called the Extended Pareto Rule (EPR): if
two disjoint coalitions A and B prefer x to y, then A[B prefers x to y.
1For helpful comments, we are grateful to the participants of the IX International Game Theory
Conference at Stony Brook, New York (July 1998); the UCLA workshop in Economic Theory (March
1999); and the Southern California Operations Research/Management Science Annual Meeting(June
1999).
1Though it appears innocuous, EPR has important consequences for the social
aggregation of individual preferences. Shapley and Shubik (1974), hereafter SS,2
introduced EPR and claimed (p. 65):
Claim 1 “with the Pareto Principle thus strengthened, we can often weaken some
of the other hypotheses [regarding completeness of the group preference] and still
obtain the existence of a social utility function. For example, we can [assume
complete group preferences] only for two-member groups. ... With the aid of the
Extended Pareto Rule, we can then derive utility functions for all other subsets
of N, including N itself.”
SS (loc. cit.) illustrated this aggregation procedure with an example wherein
a social preference for a group of three individuals &123 is derived from the pair
preferences &12 and &23. In this example, both the individual and social preferences
are expressed by means of ordinal utilities. However, “even stronger conclusions can
sometimes be drawn when we are working with conditionsthat lead to cardinal utility.”
(SS, p. 68).
In this paper we formalize and prove Claim 1 utilizing a cardinal framework. Still,
as indicated in the three-individual example of SS, a similar results appears to hold in
an ordinal setting. The justi…cation for using cardinal utility for individuals is argued
on several grounds in SS. Beside the usual interpretation that stems from choices over
lotteries, where utilities can be interpreted as probabilities, SS emphasizes the ability
of a cardinal utility scale to represent strength or intensity of preference (see Shapley
1974).3 We …nd the notion of strength of preference very natural for interpreting
statements about interpersonal comparisons of utility units (DeMeyer and Plott 1971
and Saposnik 1975). Cardinality of the group preference then gives us the possibility
of aggregating and averaging individual intensities of preference.
Cardinal group preferences were …rst proposed by Fleming (1952) and Harsanyi
(1955) on the normative ground that the Independence Axiom (the Sure Thing Prin-
2SS …rst appeared as a Rand report; it was subsequently published as chapters 4 and 5 of Shubik
(1982).
3Under natural assumptions, the cardinal utility function representing intensities of preference
coincides with the cardinal utility function representing choices over lotteries. See Sarin (1982) for
a treatment of this point in the context of Subjective Expected Utility.
2ciple) is desirable for coalitions as well as individuals.4 Including this axiom to the
group preference, and relaxing the Completeness Axiom, we obtain an elegant rep-
resentation theorem (Aumann 1962 and Shapley5): in the same way that a complete
(cardinal) preference is represented by a ray of utility functions (the positive multi-
ples of some utility function u), an incomplete preference & can be represented by a
convex cone U of utility functions, so that x is preferredto y ifand only if u(x) ¸ u(y)
for all u in U.
Section 2 summarizes the theory of incomplete preferences. In Section 3 we utilize
utility cones to characterize EPR.6 We progressively explore the implications of this
characterization when individuals are assumed to have complete preferences. For
example, if the coalition 12 has a complete pair preference &12, then the utility
representing &12 takes the additive form u12 = (u1 + ±1;2u2)=(1 + ±1;2). The weight
±1;2 e¤ectively establishes terms of interpersonal comparison of utility units (utility
di¤erences), that we call the utility comparison rate between 1 and 2. Interestingly,
withthree (or more) individuals we …nd that EPR implies a “no arbitrage” condition
in the utility comparison rates; if the pairs 12 and 23 have complete preferences, with
utility comparison rates ±1;2 and ±2;3, then a complete preference for 13 must have
utility comparison rate ±1;3 ´ ±1;2±2;3. Surprisingly, under these conditions, &123 is
necessarily complete and has utility u123 = (u1 + ±1;2u2 + ±1;3u3)=(1 + ±1;2 + ±1;3).
Because no condition other than EPR was imposed on the originally incomplete
preference &123, we witness the emergence of a complete ordering for the triple 123
based on complete preferences for the individuals and two pairs.
4Under cardinality of group preferences and the Pareto Rule, Harsanyi (1955) showed that the
utility representing the group preference is a weighted sum of individual utilities. This result moti-
vated Diamond’s (1967) critique: if u12 = u1 + u2, then the pair is indi¤erent between (a) a lottery
that gives each agent an expected utility of 1=2, and (b) a sure prospect giving u1 = 1 and u2 = 0.
This indi¤erence is, for Diamond, unacceptable. As shown in Sen (1970 p. 393-394), Diamond’s
argument depends crucially on the individuals utility level (and thus the “origin”) being comparable.
Because we only express comparisons of utility units, and not utility levels, Diamond’s objection
does not apply here.
5Shapley’s original paper remains unpublished, but can be consulted in the preliminary section
of Baucells and Shapley (1998). In contrast with Aumann’s paper, Shapley’s encompasses in…nite-
dimensional prospect spaces.
6In short, EPR holds if and only if the utility cone UA[B is contained in the convex hull of UA
and UB, for all disjoint coalitions A and B.
3A cardinal framework facilitates the geometrical representation of the previous
result. Because each individual utility ui is a point in a vector space, EPR implies
that u12 is a point on the line segment u1u2. Similarly, given u12 and u23, EPR
…nds u123 as the unique intersection of u1u23 and u12u3. With four of more agents,
it is interesting that Desargues’s Theorem — a geometrical result attributed to the
17th century French mathematician Girard Desargues7 — can be used to show how
a preference &S is consistent with EPR as applied to di¤erent partitions fA;Bg of
S. The geometric representation in a plane also highlights the need for certain linear
independence conditions to avoid degeneracy.
Section 4 presents the two main results, which are the extension of the previous
…ndings to n agents. They are both stated under minimal requirements regarding
linear independence. In essence, if we are given complete preferences for some pairs
forming a spanning tree, then EPR implies the emergence of a complete preference
for some coalitions, including N, the set of agents (Theorem 9); and if all the pairs
havecomplete preferences, thenall thecoalitions havecomplete preferences(Theorem
12). Any such complete preference is represented by a weighted sum of the individual
utilities, i.e., uS =
P
i2S ¸iui for all S µ N. The n ¡ 1 independent weights are
obtained from the preferences of any n ¡ 1 pairs forming a spanning tree in the
group.
Section 5 discusses some of our assumptions. We point out at the relation be-
tween “stability” of the group preference and a very mild assumption called Minimal
Consensus: there are two prospects x;y such that all agents strictly prefer x to y. We
also introduce a certain weakening of EPR inthe subsection “Masters and Servants.”
The …nal subsection suggests some extensions.
Our theory naturally leads to an interpretation of preference aggregation as a
process that begins withcomplete orderings for individuals. If we recognizethe ability
of pairs to establish terms of utility comparisons, then EPR dictates consistency
conditions that build complete orderings, from small coalitions to large coalitions.
Consequently, we discover that once the problem of welfare comparisons is resolved
at a pair level, then it is resolved for the group at large.
7As a historical note, Girard Desargues (1593-1662) was Blaise Pascal’s mentor. Desargues made
important contributions to projective geometry. The theorem bearing his name was published in
1648 (see Field and Gray 1997).
4In the social choice literature, EPR has been recently used in Dhillon (1998) and
Dhillon and Mertens (1999). Our formulation here di¤ers from the traditional one in
the social choice literature in that we do not assume the existence of a social welfare
function (a complete group preference).8 Instead, by just assuminga partial ordering,
we derive a complete ordering, thus giving an axiomatic basis for the existence of a
social welfare function.
This paper focuses on …nding conditions that lead to complete preferences for the
group and the rest of coalitions. Using the same formulation, Baucells and Shap-
ley (1999) considers pair agreements that exhibit some degree of incompleteness.
After characterizing a measure of incompleteness satisfying cardinal invariance and
additivity, we explore how the incompleteness in the pair preferences restricts the
incompleteness of the group preference.
2 Review of the Theory of Incomplete Preferences
The underlying domain of prospects over which the preferences are given will be
denoted by M, sometimes called a mixture space (see Hausner 1951). For simplicity,
it will be assumed here that M is a …nite dimensional, closed, convex subset of
Rm. We further stipulate M to have dimension m, so that M contains interior
points. The location of the origin with respect to M is arbitrary. For example,
the simplex M = f(x1;:::;xm) 2 Rm :
Pm
k=1xk ￿ 1;xk ¸ 0g could represent the set
of probability mixtures over m + 1 “pure” prospects k 2 f0;1;:::;mg. The pure
prospect k = 0 occupies the origin of Rm and has probability 1 ¡
Pm
k=1xk, whereas
the other pure prospects take the unit vectors of Rm and have probability xk, k 2
f1;:::;ng. Probability mixtures of two prospects x and y are identi…ed with the
prospect ®x+ (1¡ ®)y, for suitable ® 2 [0;1].
Here are the four axioms for an incomplete preference9 relation & —they are
asserted for all x;y;z 2 M and all ® 2 [0;1]:
8A social welfare function may not exist, as shown in Arrow (1963). This non-existence result is
extended by Kalai and Schmeidler (1977) to the context of cardinal preferences. For a discussion of
Arrow’s non-existence result, see SS pp. 69-79.
9Here “incomplete” is short for “possibly incomplete”; if we wish to exclude the complete case
we shall say “not complete.”
5(P1) Re‡exivity: x & x.
(P2) Transitivity: If x & y and y & z, then x & z.
(P3) Independence: For all ® 6= 0, x & y if and onlyif®x+(1¡®)z & ®y+(1¡®)z.
(P4) Continuity: The set f® : x & ®y +(1 ¡ ®)zg is closed.
If x & y but not y & x we say that x is strictly preferred to y and write x Â y;
if both x & y and y & x we say that x and y are indi¤erent and write x s y; and
if neither x & y nor y & x we say that x and y are incomparable and write xjy. If
M has no incomparable pairs then & is said to be complete; this can be expressed
axiomatically by replacing (P1) with
(P10) Completeness: Either x & y or y & x.
Axioms P1 ¡ P4 imply that D(y) = fx 2 M : x & yg, the preference set of
y 2 M, is a closed, convex cone in M with vertex y.10 Moreover, if y and w are two
interior points, then D(y) and D(w) contain the same “directions of preference.”11
Thus, given an interior point y± 2 M, we can de…ne the preference cone D of & as
the closed cone in Rm with vertex 0 that extends the directions of preference of D(y±)
to Rm. Formally,
D ´ ¸[D(y±) ¡ y±] = f¸(x¡ y±) 2 Rm : x 2 D(y±); ¸ > 0g:
Proposition 2 Let & be an incomplete preference relation de…ned on M, and D its
preference cone. Then for all x;y 2 M,
x & y () x¡ y 2 D (1)
Conversely, let D be any closed convex cone in Rm with vertex 0, and let M be any
convex subset of Rm. Then the relation & that (1) de…nes is an incomplete preference
relation on M.
Proof. See the preliminary section of Baucells and Shapley (1998) for details.
Let us denote by M¤ the set of all real-valued functions on M that are both linear
and homogeneous. Then, M¤ coincides with Rm, the space of linear homogeneous
10K µ V is a cone in V µ Rm with vertex v if and only if ¸(x ¡ v) 2 K for all x 2 K and all
¸ > 0 such that ¸(x ¡ v) 2 V. If V = Rm, then K is a cone with vertex 0 if and only if K is closed
under positive scalar multiplication.
11Consider x;y;z;w 2 M such that x ¡ y = ¸(z ¡ w) for some ¸ > 0, i.e., the half lines ¡ ! yx and
¡ ! wz are parallel. Then, x 2 D(y) if and only if z 2 D(w).
6functions on Rm.12 Let D be a preference cone and D¤ its polar cone in M¤ de…ned
by D¤ = fu 2 Rm : u(x) ¸ 0 for all x 2 Dg. Similarly, the “polar” of D¤ may be




Figure 1: D¤ is the polar cone of D.
The weak inequalities in these de…nitions ensure that D¤ and D¤¤ are both closed,
convex cones in Rm with vertex 0. Moreover, the two polar mappings are mutual
inverses, D = D¤¤, sothat D¤ can be usedunambiguously to represent the incomplete
preference % associated with D. Further, any set U µ Rm such that U¤ = D
represents % as well. Speci…cally, we say that U is the utility cone of % ifU = D¤nf0g
whenever D¤ 6= f0g, and U = f0g otherwise.
Theorem 3 Let & be an incomplete preference relation de…ned on M µ Rm. There
exists a non-empty subset U µ M¤ = Rm such that for all x;y 2 M,
x & y () u(x) ¸ u(y) for all u 2 U: (2)
Conversely, given any set U µ Rm, the relation de…ned by (2) is an incomplete
preference relation with preference cone U¤.
Proof. See the preliminary section of Baucells and Shapley (1998) for details.
We note that when M is in the in…nite-dimensional, one needs some technical quali-
…cations to ensure that D = D¤¤.
It is useful to describe several incomplete preferences associated with certain spe-
cial types of preference and utility cones. If & is a non-trivial complete preference,
12Thus, u(x) becomes the inner product of the vector u = (u1;:::;um), and the prospect x =
(x1;:::;xm). Because each xk is the probability associated with pure prospect k, u(x) is the “expected
utility” of x. Also, observe that the normalization u(0) = 0 is done for mathematical convenience:
the location of 0 with respect to M is arbitrary.
7then D is a half-space, and U is the normal ray contained in D. A trivial preference
(all pairs are regarded as indi¤erent) corresponds to D = Rm and U = f0g. Thus, if
& is a complete preference, then any element of U is a non-negative multiple of any
other element of U: we say that & is complete and has utility u, for some u 2 U.
More generally, & contains indi¤erencerelations ifand only ifD contains lines. On
the contrary, if D is a pointed cone (i.e., contains no complete lines, like the negative
orthant), then & is a “strict” partial ordering, having pairs of incomparable elements
but not pairs of indi¤erent elements.13 More “exotic” incomplete preferences arise if
D is a subspace of Rm. Then U is the subspace orthogonal to D and & has no strict
preferences: M decomposes into a collection of mutually incomparable indi¤erence
classes.14
3 Incomplete Coalition Preferences and the Ex-
tended Pareto Rule
Given a set N = f1;:::;ng of individuals, we …x M as the common prospect space.
For example, the set of pure prospects in M could correspond to a list of m + 1
public projects, or a set of m + 1 feasible allocations of (indivisible) goods. Endow
each coalition S µ N with an incomplete preference &S on M, and let DS and US
be its corresponding preference and utility cone. The empty coalition is assigned the
trivial preference. Confusiondoes not arise if we use i, ij,... to indicate coalitions fig,
fi;jg,... We restrict attention to the case where the agents have non-trivial, complete
preferences &i with utilities 0 6= ui 2 Rm, for all i 2 N: the utility cone Ui associated
with &i is the ray of positive multiples of ui. Let Sp(u1;u2;:::) denote the vector
subspace spanned by some collection of utilities, and d(u1;u2;:::) its dimension.
One might want to identify the coalition preference &S with the Paretian prefer-
13If D is a full-dimensional pointed cone, then U is also a full-dimensional pointed cone. For
example, if D is the negative orthant, then U is also the negative orthant.
14An extreme example is given by D = f0g and U = Rm: all pairs of distinct prospects are




&S given by the unanimity rule: for all x;y 2 M,
x
p
&S y () x %i y for all i 2 S: (3)
p
&S is an incomplete preference in the sense of Axioms P1¡P4, and has utility cone
U
p
S = Co([i2SUi), where Co(¢) indicates the convex hull.15 Unless all the members
of S share identical preferences, the Paretian preference will contain incomparable
pairs.16 In general, for completeness of group preference to arise we need the ability
of certain coalitions to establish comparisons beyond the ones given in (3). Thus,
we just retain the weak Pareto Rule given by the ( implication in (3). Our setting,
which treats individuals and coalitions alike, allows for an important strengthening
of the Pareto rule.
A collection of preferences &S, S µ N, satis…es the Extended Pareto Rule (EPR)
if for all disjoint coalitions A and B, and for all x;y 2 M,
x %A y; x %B y =) x %A[B y; and (4)
x ÂA y; x %B y =) x ÂA[B y: (5)
EPR is equivalent to the seemingly more general rule in which the corresponding
version of (4) and (5) holds for any partition P of a coalition S. For example, if
fA;B;Cg is a partition of S and x ÂA y, x %B y, and x %C y, then imposing (5) to
A and B produces x ÂA[B y; and imposing (5) to A [B and C yields x ÂS y. In
particular, EPR implies the usual Pareto Rule.
Let CoA;B denote the convex hull ofUA[UB, and Cori
A;B denotethe set ofrelatively
internal points in CoA;B.17 EPR can be characterized in terms of utility cones as
15Using Paretian preferences in the context of multi-criteria decision making, Yu (1974) describes
Pareto undominated outcomes associated with certain polyhedral utility cones, i.e., cones de…ned
by a …nite number of extreme rays.
16For an “exotic” example of a Paretian preference, let %1 and %2 be opposite preferences, i.e.,
u¹ 1 = ¡u¹ 2 6= 0. Then U12 = Co(U¹ 1;U¹ 2) is a subspace (a line), and D
p





»12 y whenever both x »¹ 1 y and x »¹ 2 y, and regards all the other
pairs in M as incomparable.
17Formally, CoA;B = f(1 ¡ ®)uA + ®uB 2 Rm : uA 2 UA;uB 2 UB; 0 ￿ ® ￿ 1g; and u¤ 2 CoA;B
is relatively internal to CoA;B if for all u 2 CoA;B there is a u0 such that u¤ = (1 ¡ ®)u + ®u0 for
some 0 < ® < 1. In …nite-dimensional spaces, a point is relatively internal to a convex set if and
only if it is relatively interior (in the usual topology).
9follows.
Proposition 4 The Extended Pareto Rule holds if and only if for any two disjoint
coalitions A and B,
UA[B µ CoA;B; and (6)
UA[B \Cori
A;B 6= ;: (7)
Proof. By the de…nitionof preference cone, (4) is equivalent toDA\DB µ DA[B;
and by the properties of polar cones (see Rockafellar 1967, p. 149-151), DA \DB µ
DA[B , D¤
A[B µ (DA \DB)¤ = (D¤
A [D¤
B)¤¤. Because (¢)¤¤ is the closure of the set
of positive multiples of convex combinations of a given set, and (D¤
A[D¤
B) is already








B). A moment’s re‡ection reveals that this last inclusion,
together with the condition
If UA[B = f0g; then 0 2 CoA;B; (8)
is equivalent to (6). But (5) implies (8): if 0 = 2 CoA;B, then CoA;B is a pointed cone,
i.e., both &A and &B contain strict preferences, so that &A[B also contains strict
preferences and UA[B 6= f0g. Consequently, [(4),(5))(6)], and [(6))(4)].
[(4),(5))(7)] Suppose that (7) fails so that UA[B µ CoA;BnCori
A;B. We enlarge
CoA;B and de…ne the full dimensional cone KA;B = CoA;B£Sp(CoA;B)?, which is the
Cartesian product of CoA;B with the subspace orthonormal to Sp(CoA;B). Of course,
Cori
A;B is contained in the interior of KA;B. Because UA[B is convex and contained in
the boundary of CoA;B, it has dimension strictly less than that of CoA;B and KA;B:
there is a hyperplane H containing UA[B and supporting KA;B. Full dimensionality
ensures that H does not intersect the interior of KA;B. Thus, H supports CoA;B and
does not intersect Cori
A;B. If x ¡ y is some normal vector of H, then u(x ¡ y) = 0
for all u 2 UA[B, and u(x ¡ y) ¸ 0 for all u 2 CoA;B. Because CoA;B is non-empty,
Cori
A;B is non-empty: there is a u 2 CoA;B such that u(x ¡ y) > 0, and we can …nd
one such u in either UA or UB, say UA. Thus, x ÂA y and x ÂB y, but x »A[B y, a
contradiction of (5).
[(6),(7))(5)] If for some x;y 2 M, x ÂA y and x %B y, then u(x¡ y) ¸ 0 for all
u 2 CoA;B, and uA(x ¡y) > 0 for some uA 2 UA. Let u¤ 2 UA[B \Cori
A;B so that for
10some u0 2 CoA;B and ® 2 (0;1), u¤ = (1 ¡ ®)uA + ®u0. By (7) u(x ¡ y) ¸ 0 for all
u 2 UA[B, and u¤(x¡ y) > 0: x ÂA[B y.
If both the individuals and the group have complete preferences (utility rays),
Proposition 4 immediately implies that the utility of the group is a weighted sum of
individual utilities, which is Harsanyi’s (1955) Theorem.




[B=SgCoA;B, where the use of
²
[assumes that AandB
are disjoint. For EPR to hold we need US µ U¤
S, and in particular U¤
S 6= ;. Because
there are 2jSj¡1 ¡ 1 ways to partition S into non-empty coalitions,18 it seems than
the veri…cation of EPR is a di¢cult task. Fortunately, the existence of preferences
satisfying EPR is not di¢cult to verify: the fact thatParetianpreferences haveutility
cones U
p
S = Co(Ui;i 2 S) con…rms (6) and (7).
One would be interested in discovering the kind of complete preferences that
may be consistent with EPR. For example, if (¸1;:::¸n) > 0 are positive weights,
then the collection of complete preferences given by uS =
P
i2S ¸iui, for all S µ N,
satis…es EPR (see proof of Theorem 12 below). Infact, we anticipate that the reverse
implicationholds as a corollary ofTheorem 12: any collectionof complete preferences
satisfying EPR is characterized by weights (¸1;:::¸n) > 0 such that uS =
P
i2S ¸iui,
for all S µ N.
3.1 Two Agents and Utility Comparison Rates
The use of Proposition 4 in this paper is con…ned to the case of complete preferences.
The following Corollary comes to no surprise considering (7).
Corollary 5 Let A and B be two disjoint coalitions, and for S 2 fA;B;A [ Bg,
assume that &S is complete and has utility uS. Then EPR holds if and only if for
some 0 < ® < 1 and ¸ > 0, uA[B = ¸[(1 ¡ ®)uA + ®uB].
A complete preference for a pair ij is called a bilateral agreement. By setting
¸ = 1 in Corollary 5 we have that a bilateral agreement &ij has utility u12 = (1 ¡
®1;2)u1 + ®1;2u2, for some 0 < ®1;2 < 1. Letting ±1;2 ´ ®1;2=(1¡ ®1;2) we shall prefer
18There are 2jSj ¡ 2 ways of choosing a non-empty proper coalition A ½ S but the partition
fA;SnAg is the same as fSnA;Ag.
11to write
u12 = (u1 + ±1;2u2)=(1+ ±1;2): (9)
If d(u1;u2) = 2, i.e., u1 and u2 are linearly independent, then ±1;2 is unique and
has the natural interpretation of a “utility comparison rate” between 1 and 2. To
elicit ±1;2 we …nd prospects x and y such that x Âi y, for i 2 f1;2g. Suppose that
individuals 1 (me) and 2 (you) are able to meaningfully say: “To realize prospect x
in place of y is µ times more valuable for you than it is for me.” For the units of
utility to re‡ect this comparison we need to re-scale the utilities using ¸1;¸2 > 0 so
that ¸1[u1(x)¡u1(y)] is expressed in the same units as ¸2µ[u2(x)¡u2(y)]. Expression
(9) renders ±1;2 as the relative scaling ¸2=¸1, or
±1;2 = µ[u1(x)¡ u1(y)]=[u2(x) ¡ u2(y)]:
The linearity of u12 impliesthatthe same±1;2 wouldbe foundiftwootherprospects
were used to elicit the terms of utility comparison.19 This has normative appeal if
ui(x) ¡ ui(y) measures i’s intensity of preference. Because 1 and 2 have established
comparison of intensities of preference, the same terms of comparison should arise
regardless of the prospects used in the elicitation. The order of agents is important
in …nding ±1;2 : if we switch the agents (1 is you and 2 is me), then (9) produces
u12 = (u2 + 1
±1;2u1)=(1 + 1
±1;2) and ±2;1 = 1=±1;2.
Henceforth, we use ±i;j (±j;i = 1=±i;j) to denote the utility comparison rate asso-
ciated with a bilateral agreement between agents i and j (j and i). The choice of
±i;j is exogenous in our model. The selection of ±i;j = 1 should not be associated
with a “fair” or symmetric pair agreement. If we re-scale the individual utilities so
that ^ ui = ¸iui and ^ uj = ¸juj, for some ¸i;¸j > 0, a given bilateral agreement having
±i;j when using ui and uj now exhibits ^ ±i;j = ±i;j¸i=¸j: the magnitude of ±i;j is not
cardinal invariant. This fact does not preclude the agents from resorting to some
normative model to …nd ±i;j.20
19Thus, if for prospects z and w, ±1;2[u2(z) ¡ u2(w)]=[u1(z)¡ u1(w)] = µ
0 > 0, then agents should
express: “To realize prospect z in place of w is µ0 times more important for you (2) than it is for
me (1).”
20For example, if the pairs use Relative Utilitarianism (Dhillon and Mertens 1999) to determine a
“fair” agreement, then the set M …xes ±i;j: the utility di¤erence between the most preferred prospect
12If one relaxes theassumption that <ij is complete, thenwe …nd that anincomplete




i;j] ofutility comparison rates (see
Baucells and Shapley 1999).
3.2 Three Agents and “No Arbitrage” in Utility Comparison
Rates
Proposition 4 will allow us to visualize the restrictions that EPR imposes on pref-
erences when n = 3. Assume m = 3, d(u1;u2;u3) = 3, and let W be the a¢ne
plane in R3 containing the points u1, u2, and u3. These points can be pictured as the
intersection of W with the rays Ui. For i 6= j, let %ij be some incomplete preference:
Uij µ Co(Ui [ Uj) in (6) implies that the intersection of the utility cone Uij with W
is a closed line segment contained in uiuj, the line segment between ui and uj. In













Figure 2: Geometrical illustration of EPR.
By applying EPR to all the partitions of 123 we obtain
U123 µ U
¤
123 ´ Co(U1 [U23) \Co(U2 [U13) \Co(U3[ U12): (10)










13If the pair preferences coincide with the Paretian preference, then U
p
ij\W = uiuj and
(10) does not restrict U123. However, if the pair preferences are more complete, then
Uij \W is strictly contained in uiuj and (10) begins to be very e¤ective in restricting
U¤
123, and hence &123.21 In particular, if U¤
123 \ W were a point, then &123 would
necessarily be complete. But notice that this is the case if &12 and &23 are complete
with utilities u12 and u23, i.e., (10) singles out a point u123 as the intersection of u1u23
and u12u3: a complete preference &123 with utility u123 emerges from two bilateral
agreements. Figure 3 below illustrates this fact, and it also reveals that U13 has to
include the intersection u13 of the line segment u1u3 and the line u2u123; otherwise















Figure 3: %123 is complete and ±1;3 = ±1;2±2;3.
The utilities u123 and u13 that stem from this geometrical construction have an
interesting interpretation as a “no arbitrage” condition in the utility comparison
rates. Let ±1;2 and ±2;3 be the utility comparison rates of the bilateral agreements
%12 and %23, respectively. If receiving prospect x in place of y is ±1;2 times more
important for 2 than it is for 1, and ±2;3 times more important for 3 than it is for 2,
21Note that certain precautions are needed: no preference %123 is consistent with EP R if U ¤
123 is
empty. Clearly, in Figure 2 one can choose Uij so that U ¤
123 = ;.
22Figure 3 also illustrates that EPR needs to be imposed on disjoint coalitions: u123 does not lie
in the line segment u13u23. This point was brought to our attention by Bill Zame.
14then it should be ±1;2±2;3 times more important for 3 than it is for 1. Similar to “no
arbitrage” in currency exchange rates, the natural utility comparison rate between 1
and 3 is ±1;3 = ±1;2±2;3. If ±1;3 < ±1;2±2;3, then agent 3 will prefer to communicate with
1 via 2; on the contrary, if ±1;3 > ±1;2±2;3, then agent 3 will prefer to communicate
with 1 directly. When equality holds, any communication channel between any two
individuals is acceptable.
We present a formal treatment to the previous discussion that uses a condition
weaker than d(u1;u2;u3) = 3.
Lemma 6 Assume that EPR holds, and consider bilateral agreements &12 and &23
with utility comparison rates ±1;2 and ±2;3 that determine u12 and u23. Let ±1;3 ´
±1;2±2;3, u123 ´ (u1+±1;2u2+±1;3u3)=(1+±1;2+±1;3), and u13 ´ (u1+±1;3u3)=(1+±1;3).
a: If u1 = 2 Sp(u3;u12) and u3 = 2 Sp(u1;u23), then &123 is complete and has utility
u123.
b: If &123 is complete with utility u123, and u2 = 2 Sp(u1;u3), then u13 2 U13, i.e.,
if &13 is complete, then it has utility u13.
Proof. (a) By (6), for any 0 6= u¤ 2 U123 there are ®;¯ 2 [0;1] and ¸®;¸¯ ¸ 0
such that
¸®[(1 ¡ ®)u1+ ®u23] = u
¤ = ¸¯[(1 ¡ ¯)u12 + ¯u3]: (11)
From the de…nitions of u12 and u23, u12 = fu1+ ±1;2[u23+ ±2;3(u23 ¡ u3)]g=(1+±1;2).
Substituting this expression in the right-hand side of (11) produces an expression
involving only u1, u23, u3. Because u3 = 2 Sp(u1;u23) (in particular u3 6= 0), we
equate the coe¢cients of u3 in the modi…ed expression (11) to conclude that ¯ =
±1;3=(1+ ±1;2+±1;3). Replacing ¯ and u12 = (u1+±1;2u2)=(1+±1;2) in the right-hand
side of (11) yields u¤ = ¸¯u123. Thus, either &123 is trivial or it has utility u123, but
(7) excludes triviality and (a) follows.
(b) Let %13 be complete with utility u¤¤. By Corollary 5, there is some ®0 2 (0;1)
and ¸
0
® > 0 such that u123 = ¸
0
®[(1 ¡ ®0)u2 + ®0u¤¤]; similarly, some ¯
0 2 (0;1) and
¸
0





u1 + ±1;2u2 + ±1;3u3
1 +±1;2 +±1;3









15Because u2 = 2 Sp(u1;u3), either ¸
0
®(1¡®0) = ±1;2=(1+±1;2+±1;3) or ¯
0=(1¡¯
0) = ±1;3.











¯ > 0, if %13 is complete, then it has utility u13.
Upon re‡ection, this is equivalent to u13 2 U13.
To generalize the …ndings of Lemma 6 to more than three agents entails establish-
ing at least one communication channel between each pair of agents. Moreover, the
“no arbitrage” condition indicates that a chain of bilateral agreements that “cycles”
(starts and …nishes in the same agent) contains redundancies. If we view the agents
as the nodes of a graph and the bilateral agreements as the edges, then these two
conditions express that the bilateral agreements form a connected and acyclic graph,
i.e., a spanning tree.
3.3 Four Agents and Desargues’s Theorem
The case of four players permits the geometrical illustration of the proposed con-
struction and reveals one unexpected di¢culty. In the example of Figure 3, consider
a fourth agent, which for illustration purposes has u4 2 W and d(u2;u3;u4) = 3 (see
Figure 4). Let T = f12;23;34g be the spanning tree and add the bilateral agreement
&34. The application of Lemma 6a using u2;u3;u4;±2;3; and ±3;4 produces a complete
preference &234, with u234 as the intersection of u2u34 and u23u4. Because we have
complete preferences for &123, we obtain a complete preference &1234 with u1234 given
by the intersection of u123u4 and u1u234. However, there is a third segment available,
namely u12u34. Moreover, the two applications of Lemma 6b yield u13 2 U13 and
u24 2 U24: if &13 and &24 were complete, then the segment u13u24 would also be
available. It is impossible to have consistent and complete preferences unless these
four segments are concurrent, i.e., they have a common point of intersection. This
di¢culty can be addressed in geometric terms by means of Desargues’s theorem.
Theorem 7 (Desargues 1648) Let pi and qi, for i = 1;2;3 be two sets of indepen-
dent points in a vector space satisfying pi 6= qi (i = 1;2;3). Then, the segments piqi,
i = 1;2;3 are concurrent if and only if the three points sij = pipj\qiqj, 1 ￿ i < j ￿ 3
are collinear.
16u23 13 ( ) s
u
12 2 ( ) p
u1234
u34 2 ( ) q
u3 23 ( ) s
u2 12 ( ) s
u
1 1 ( ) p






u4 3 ( ) q
u234 1 ( ) q
Figure 4: The Desargues’s theorem.
Figure 4 illustrates Desargues’s theorem as applied to
p1 = u1 p2 = u12 p3 = u123
q1 = u234 q2 = u34 q3 = u4
¾
) s12 = u2 s13 = u23 s23 = u3
By EPR, s13 2 s12s23 so that the line segments u1u234, u12u34, and u123u4 are con-
current: u1234 is well de…ned. To see that u1234 2 u13u24, declare p0
2 = u13 and
q0
2 = u24, and maintain the other four points. The desired conclusion follows from
s0
13 = u23 2 u3u2 = s0
12s0
23.
Consider the following generalization of Lemma 6.
Lemma 8 For some collection of weights (¸1;:::¸n) > 0, consider the utility func-




i2T ¸i), for T µ N. Let A;B;C be disjoint coalitions and
S = A [B [C. The following are consequences of the EPR.
a: Suppose uA = 2 Sp(uC;uA[B) and uC = 2 Sp(uA;uB[C). For T 2 fA;C;A[C;B[
Cg, if &T is complete and has utility uT, then &S is complete and has utility uS.
b: Suppose uB = 2 Sp(uA;uC). For T 2 fA;B;C;Sg, if &T is complete and has
utility uT, then uA[C 2 UA[C, i.e., if &A[C is complete, then it has utility uA[C.
17Proof. To see that the utility comparison rates between two disjoint coalitions A


























The result then follows from Lemma 6 by using uA, uB, uC, ±A;B, and ±B;C in place of





i2S ¸i) = uS:
Desargues’s theorem follows from Lemma 8: the two intersection points u123u4\
u1u234 and u123u4\u12u34 result from applying Lemma 8a to the partitions f1;23;4g
and f12;3;4g, respectively. Because we can utilize the weights ¸1 = 1, ¸2 = ±1;2,





i=1¸i). In geometry, a true proposition is obtained if we
interchange the roles of lines and points, and concurrency and collinearity. Because
the Desargues’s theorem is self-dual, the converse automatically holds.23
The Desargues’s theorem is by no means restricted to coplanar points and lines.
To “see” why Desargues’s theorem holds in higher dimensions, consider a point u in
Rm, and three lines `i, i 2 f1;2;3g concurrent to u. Let P and Q be two planes,
each intersecting the three lines at points pi and qi, i 2 f1;2;3g, respectively. Soon
we realize that the points sij, 1 ￿ i < j ￿ 3, belong to the line s of intersection of
P and Q, i.e., they are collinear. This can be seen in Figure 4 by conceiving three
dimensions and letting u = u1234.
4 The case of n Agents: A Utility Comparison Sys-
tem
We now proceed to introduce some de…nitions in order to generalize Lemma 6 to the
case of n agents. An (undirected) graph is pair (N;G), where G is a collection of two-
member coalitions ofN. Ifij 2 G, thenwesay that i is adjacent toj in (N;G). Agents
23For the use of Desargues’s theorem with larger coalitions, consider three lines given by uAiuSnAi,
i 2 f1;2;3g. For 1 ￿ i < j ￿ 3, suppose that Ai ½ Aj, and that coalitions Ai, SnAi, AjnAi have
complete preferences: letting pi = Ai and qi = SnAi, produces sij = AjnAi. s13 2 s12s23 follows
from A3nA1 = (A2nA1)
²
[ (A3nA2) and EPR.
18i and j are connected in (N;G) if there is a sequence of agents (i = i1;i2;:::;ik = j)
in N such that irir+1 2 G for every r 2 f1;:::;k ¡ 1g. Any such sequence is called a
path in (N;G). We use T instead of G whenever T is a spanning tree of N. T is a
spanning tree of N if and only if there is a unique path in (N;T) connecting any two
agents in N. It follows that T contains precisely n¡ 1 pairs.
Equipped with a spanning tree T , and the respective utility comparison rates
between pairs in T , we propose the appropriate weights to determine the utilities for
coalitions. We chose an arbitrary base agent, say i = 1, as the “root” of the tree.
De…ne ¸1 ´ 1, and for j 6= 1, if (1 = i1;i2;:::;ik = j) is the unique path between 1





A moment’s re‡ection reveals that a di¤erent choice of base agent, say i¤ 6= 1, would
produce weights ±i¤;1¸j, j 2 N. Because the utility representation of %S that we are








, the choice of base agent is immaterial.
4.1 Complete Preferences for Connected Coalitions
Inthe example with 4 agent we derive complete preferences for certaincoalitions with
a de…nite property: given an spanning tree T of N, we say that S is connected in
T if TS ´ fij 2 T : i;j 2 Sg is a spanning tree of S. Let C denote the collection
of connected coalitions in T . Singleton coalitions are always connected; a pair ij is
connected if and only if ij 2 T . More importantly, the grand coalition N is always
connected.24 An agent i 2 S is terminal in a connected coalition S if there is only
one j 2 S such that ij 2 TS.
We say that T is non-degenerate if d(ui;uj;uk) = 3 for any ijk 2 C;25 and N is
24The number of connected coalitions will depend on the form of T . Consider the two extreme
examples: a line tree T ` = ffi ¡ 1;ig : i = 2;:::ng, and a star tree T ¤ = ff1;ig : i = 2;:::ng. In
T ` we count n ¡ k + 1 connected coalitions of size k that gather a total of n(n + 1)=2 connected
coalitions, which is small with respect to 2n, the total number of coalitions. In T ¤ there are n











the total number of connected coalitions is 2n¡1 + n¡ 1; the fraction of connected coalitions tends
to 1=2 as n increases.
The number of spanning trees on a set of n agents, by Cayley’s formula, is nn¡2.
25In Figure 4, for example, we could encompass the case where u1 = u4.
19non-degenerate if d(ui;uj;uk) = 3 for any ijk µ N. Of course, if N is non-degenerate,
then so is any spanning tree of N. Note that we need m ¸ 3 to have non-degeneracy,
and that for any such m, non-degeneracy is a “generic” property.
Theorem 9 Let T be a non-degenerate spanning tree of bilateral agreements and let
(¸1;:::;¸n) be given as in (14). If the Extended Pareto Rule holds, then for all S 2 C,














Proof. If C is the collection of connected coalitions in T , let Cr indicate the
connected coalition of size r. We claim that for r ¸ 3 and S 2 Cr, then there is a
partition fA;B;Cg of S such that fA;C;A [B;B [Cg µ C and
uA = 2 Sp(uC;uA[B) and uC = 2 Sp(uA;uB[C). (16)
The result easily follows from the claim: If S 2 C3, then the partition of S given
by the claim has its elements in C1 [C2. Because &T is complete and has utility uT
for all T 2 C1 [C2, Lemma 8a establishes this property for &S. Similarly, once this
is established for all T 2 C`, ` < r, then it also holds for all S 2 Cr; the partition
fA;B;Cg of S given by the claim has its members in C`, ` < r, and (16) allow us to
apply Lemma 8a.
We establish the claim by induction. For r = 3, let ijk 2 C3 and de…ne the
partition fA;B;Cg = fi;j;kg of ijk, so that fi;k;ij;jkg µ C. T non-degenerate
guarantees (16).
For r ¸ 4, assume that the claim is true for all the coalitions in C`, ` < r. If
degeneracies were not a problem, the proof would be as follows. If S 2 Cr and i 2 S
is a terminal node of S, then Sni 2 Cr¡1. Let f ~ A; ~ B; ~ Cg be the partition of Sni given
by induction, and j the unique adjacent of i in Sni. The partition fA;B;Cg of S is
de…ned as follows: if j 2 ~ A, then use f ~ A[i; ~ B; ~ Cg; if j 2 ~ B, then use f ~ A; ~ B [i; ~ Cg;
and if j 2 ~ C, then use f ~ A; ~ B; ~ C [ig. One observes that fA;C;A[B;B[Cg µ C in
all three cases. However, Condition (16) may fail if d(uA;uB;uC) < 3. The remedy
consist of …rst replacing the terminal node i by a connected coalition R 2 C1 [ C2
such that SnR 2 C and uSnR 6= 0. If f ~ A; ~ B; ~ Cg is the partition of SnR given by
20induction, we ensure Condition (16) by choosing which two coalitions to “glue” from
f ~ A; ~ B; ~ C;Rg to produce the partition fA;B;Cg of S.
To …nd R, let j be the node with a maximal number t(j) of terminal adjacent
nodes in Cr. If t(j) = 1, then let i be this terminal node and de…ne R = i if uSni 6= 0,
and R = ij otherwise (because ¸juj 6= 0, uSnij 6= 0). If t(j) ¸ 2, let i and k be
two terminal adjacent nodes of j and de…ne R = i if uSni 6= 0, and R = k otherwise
(if uSni = 0, then d(ui;uj;uk) = 3 implies uSnk 6= 0). Thus, R 2 C, SnR 2 C` for
some ` ¸ 3 (note that when r = 4, a non-degenerate T guarantees that R = i and
SnR 2 C3), and uSnR 6= 0. By induction, let f ~ A; ~ B; ~ Cg be the partition of SnR
satisfying the claim. Because of the symmetric role of ~ A and ~ C, we can assume
without loss of generality that either R[ ~ A 2 C or R[ ~ B 2 C and de…ne the partition
fA;B;Cg of S as follows:
R [ ~ A 2 C A B C Case
(a1) R ~ A ~ B [ ~ C if u~ C 2 Sp(u ~ A[R;u ~ B[~ C)
(a2) R ~ A[ ~ B ~ C if u ~ A[R 2 Sp(u~ C;u ~ A[ ~ B[R)
(a3) ~ C ~ B ~ A[R otherwise.
R[ ~ B 2 C A B C Case
(b1) R ~ B [ ~ C ~ A if u ~ C 2 Sp(u ~ A;u ~ B[~ C[R)
(b2) R ~ A[ ~ B ~ C if u ~ A 2 Sp(u~ C;u ~ A[~ B[R)
(b3) ~ A ~ B [R ~ C otherwise.
Uponexamination one con…rms that fA;C;A[B;B[Cg µ C holds inall six cases.
By construction, (16) holds in cases (a3) and (b3). We now give the details showing
that (16) holds in (a1), i.e., that uR = 2 Sp(u~ B[~ C;u ~ A[R) and u ~ B[~ C = 2 Sp(uR;uSnR). The
cases (a2), (b1) and (b2) are a repetition of the same arguments. Recall that by the
inductive hypotheses given by (16), both u ~ A = 2 Sp(u ~ C;u ~ A[~ B) and u~ C = 2 Sp(u ~ A;u~ B[~ C).
If (a1) applies, then u ~ C 2 Sp(u ~ A[R;u ~ B[~ C) (see Figure 5), and so u~ C = ®u ~ A[R +
¯u~ B[~ C for some ® and ¯. That u~ C = 2 Sp(u ~ A;u ~ B[~ C) rules out ® = 0, and using
u ~ A[R = (uR +±R; ~ Au ~ A)=(1+ ±R; ~ A) as in (13) we write
uR = (1 +±R; ~ A)(u~ C ¡ ¯u ~ B[~ C)=®¡ ±R; ~ Au ~ A: (17)
Also, u ~ A = 2 Sp(u ~ C;u ~ A[~ B) is incompatible with u~ B[~ C = ¡°u ~ A, for some ° ¸ 0.
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Figure 5: Identify A = R, B = ~ A, and C = ~ B [ ~ C when u~ C 2 Sp(u ~ A[R;u ~ B[~ C).
implies °± ~ A;~ B[~ C 6= 1 and u ~ A 2 Sp(uSnR). This, coupled with USnR µ Co(u ~ C;u ~ A[~ B)
contradicts u ~ A = 2 Sp(u ~ C;u ~ A[~ B).
Now, assumethat uR 2 Sp(u~ B[~ C;u ~ A[R)so that uR = ®1u~ B[~ C+¯1(uR+±R; ~ Au ~ A)for
some ®1;¯1. If¯1 6= 1, then use (17) toeliminate uR and obtainu ~ C = 2 Sp(u ~ A;u~ B[~ C), a
contradiction. If ¯1 = 1, thenu ~ B[~ C = ¡±R; ~ Au ~ A=®1, contradicting u ~ A = 2 Sp(u~ C;u ~ A[ ~ B).
Similarly, assume that u~ B[~ C 2 Sp(uR;uSnR), so that u~ B[~ C = ®2uR + ¯2(u ~ A +
± ~ A; ~ B[~ Cu ~ B[~ C) for some ®2;¯2. If ®2 6= 0, then use (17) to eliminate uR and obtain
u~ C = 2 Sp(u ~ A;u~ B[~ C), a contradiction. If ®2 = 0, then u~ B[~ C = ¯2u ~ A=(1 ¡ ¯2± ~ A;~ B[~ C),
contradicting u ~ A = 2 Sp(u~ C;u ~ A[~ B), provided ¯2± ~ A; ~ B[~ C 6= 1. This same contradiction
arises if ¯2± ~ A; ~ B[~ C = 1 and u ~ A = 0.
Degeneracies aside, the proof of Theorem 9 reveals that to establish &S complete
with utility uS we just need four coalitions A, C, A [ B, B [ C having this same
property and forming a partition fA;B;Cg of S. Thus, a fraction of the coalitions
in C is needed to reach the conclusion that &N is complete and has utility uN. More
formally, to derive the completeness of &N, one needs a collection E of coalitions
containing the singletons, the pairs in some spanning tree, and N, and possessing
the following property: If S 2 E, then there is a partition fA;B;Cg of S such that
fA;C;A [ B;B [ Cg µ E. Of course, C is one such collection and an interesting
question for future research is …nding the minimal such collections.
224.2 Complete Preferences for all Coalitions
Theorem 9 generalizes Lemma 6a to all the connected coalitions. One expects that
the generalization of Lemma 6b is to conclude uS 2 US for S µ N, where uS is given
as in (15). This is in fact true for the pairs and “almost” true for the rest of the
coalitions.
Example 10 EPR and N non-degenerate is compatible with uS = 2 US for some
S = 2 C. Thus, we may have &S complete and having utility u0
S 6= ¸uS, for all ¸ > 0.
Figure 6 illustrates an example where N = f1;2;3;4g is non-degenerate, &134 is















Figure 6: EPR does not necessarily imply uS 2 US.
If d(u1;u2;u34) = 2, then the lines u1u34 and u2u1234 are parallel, and any u0
134
chosen from the segment u1234u34 satis…es u0
134 2 u1u34 and u1234 2 u0
134u2. It remains
to showthat EPR as applied to the partitions f14;3g and f13;4g is compatible with
u0
134 6= u134. Indeed, if &13 and &14 are not complete, then the utility cones U13 and
U14 may contain utilities u0
13 and u0





The phenomenon exhibited in Example 10 is very unstable. We would conclude
that u134 2 U134 if d(u1;u2;u34) = 3; or if either &13 or &14 were complete. Fortu-
nately, this pathology does not a¤ect pairs.
23Theorem 11 Let T be a non-degenerate spanning tree of bilateral agreements, with
(¸1;:::;¸n) as in (14) and uS as in (15). If the Extended Pareto Rule holds, then for
all ik µ N; uik 2 Uik: if &ik is complete, then it has utility uik.
Proof. The result is trivial if ik 2 T . For ik = 2 T , let (i = i1;::::;i` = k) be
the path in T between i and k, and T = [`¡1
r=2ir 6= ;. We claim that there is a
coalition R µ T such that R 2 C, uR = 2 Sp(ui;uk), and uR[ik 2 UR[ik: because &R
is complete, the result follows from letting A = i, B = R, and C = k in Lemma 8b.
To establish the claim we de…ne R as follows. If uT = 2 Sp(ui;uk), then let R = T
(this is always the case if ` = 3). On the contrary, if uT 2 Sp(ui;uk), then T
non-degenerate implies d(ui;ui2;ui3) = 3, so that either ui2 = 2 Sp(ui;uk) or ui3 = 2
Sp(ui;uk), the former being always true by T non-degenerate if ` = 4. Accordingly,
let R = i2 or R = i2i3 so that TnR 6= ;, uT 2 Sp(ui;uk), and uR = 2 Sp(ui;uk). Having
(1 + ±R;TnR)uT = (uR + ±R;TnRuTnR) for some ±R;TnR > 0 implies uTnR = 2 Sp(ui;uk).
Because fR [ i;TnR;k;T [ ikg µ C we use A = R [ i, B = TnR, and C = k in
Lemma 8b to conclude uR[ik 2 UR[ik.
Geometrically, uR[ik is found as the intersection of the line segment uR[iuk and
the half line uT[ikuTnR. Similarly, uik is found as the intersection of the line segment
uiuk and the half line uR[ikuR. Because uik = (¸iui + ¸kuk)=(¸i + ¸k), the utility
comparison rate between i and k is given by ±i;k = ¸k=¸i =
Q`
r=1±ir¡1;ir.
Theorem 12, our second main result, derives complete preferences for all coali-
tions by assuming complete pair preferences, thus establishing Claim 1 using minimal
premises regarding linear independence.
Theorem 12 Suppose N is non-degenerate, every pair ij in N has complete prefer-
ences, and uS is given as in (15) for some spanning tree T of N. Then the Extended
Pareto Rule holds if and only if for all S µ N, &S is complete and has utility uS.
Proof. ()) The proof is based on choosing a spanning tree that renders some
desired coalition S connected, and then applying Theorem 9 to conclude that &S
is complete and has utility uS. To verify that uS does not depend on the choice
of spanning tree su¢ces to check that if ^ ¸i and ¸i are the weights computed as in
(14) using spanning trees ^ T and T , then ^ ¸i = ¸i. Clearly ^ ¸1 = ¸1 = 1, and for
i 6= 1, let (1 = i1;i2;:::;i` = i) be the unique path between 1 and i in ^ T . By
24Theorem 11, all pairs ir¡1ir 2 ^ T have complete preferences with utilities uir¡1ir =











¸iui(y), S 2 fA;Bg =) uA[B(x) ¸ uA[B(y);
and if x ÂA y, then uA(x) > uA(y) and uA[B(x) > uA[B(y).
Theorem 12 does not place special importance to any particular spanning tree.
Because all the information regarding coalition preferences is summarized in the n
individual utilities and the n ¡ 1 independent weights, a particular spanning tree
has no relevance other than embodying this information in the form of n ¡ 1 utility
comparison rates. We can draw an analogy with currency exchange rates. Consider
n countries, and choose country 1 as the reference. Having the currency exchange
rates between country 1 and all the other countries (a particular spanning tree),
allow us to compute the exchange rate between any two countries given by the path
±i;j = ±i;1±1;j = ±1;j=±1;i.
Having the weights ¸i invites us to modify the scales of the corresponding utilities
uS so as to drive all the utility comparison rates to 1. Such an additive representation
is readily obtainable if we set, for all S µ N, ^ uS ´ (
P
i2S ¸i)uS. It follows that for
any two disjoint coalitions A and B, ^ uA[B = ^ uA + ^ uB, and so ^ uS =
P
i2S ^ ui. Recall
that agent 1 was chosen as a base to compute the individual weights ¸i in (14). As
a consequence, the additive representation expresses all the utilities in the units of
agent 1. If we want to use the utility units of some other agent i¤ 6= 1, it su¢ces to
re-scale each uS by the factor ±i¤;1 = 1=¸i¤.
5 Further Remarks and Extensions
5.1 Stability of Group Preference and Minimal Consensus
We observe that the conditions uA = 2 Sp(uC;uA[B) and uC = 2 Sp(uA;uB[C) are satis-
…ed if and only if either d(uA;uB;uC) = 3, or
uA = ¡°uB[C 6= 0 and uC = ¡°
0uA[B 6= 0, for some °;°
0 > 0: (18)
25Condition (16) in Theorem 9 cannot be replaced with d(uA;uB;uC) = 3 if we are to
handle the case of uS = 0 for some S µ N. We illustrate this point by means of the
following example.
Example 13 Let N be non-degenerate. EPR may imply that &S is trivial for some
S µ N.
Let m = 3, N = f1;2;3;4;5g, and individual utilities given by u1 = (0;2;0),
u2 = (2;0;0), u3 = (¡1;¡1;1), u4 = (¡1;¡1;¡1), and u5 = (¡1;0;0). Let T =




=jSj: u1234 = 0
and u12345 = u5=5. To determine &1234, observe that any partition fA;B;Cg of 1234
satis…es (18), but exhibits d(uA;uB;uC) < 3. Nevertheless, EPR implies that &1234
is trivial. To determine &12345 by means of a partition fA0;B0;C0g we cannot count
on 1234 as an element of fA0;B0;C0;A0 [ B0;B0 [ C0g. Thus, the only choices of
partition are f12;3;45g or f1;23;45g, which in the proof of Theorem 9 corresponds
to choosing R = 45. ¥
WhenuS = 0, the preference&S isextremely unstable: hadsome individualutility
been slightly di¤erent, say u0
i = ui+u, for some u 6= 0, then the corresponding group
preference would have had utility u0
S = u. However, the choice u00
i = ui ¡ u would
produce u00
S = ¡u, i.e., exactly the opposite preference. This undesired behavior is
ruledout by imposing theconditionof Minimal Consensus: there exists twoprospects
x;y 2 M such that for all i 2 N, x Âi y. Clearly, Minimal Consensus and (5) imply
x ÂS y: no coalition has a trivial preference.
5.2 Continuity under Minimal Consensus
Non-degeneracy of N is a “generic” property whenever m ¸ 3, i.e., it holds for an
open dense set in the space Rmn of individual pro…les (ui)i2N. Intuitively, if we
choose n utilities at random from Rm, then the probability that any three of them
are linearly dependent is zero. This observation suggests extending our results to
degenerate individual pro…les by using continuity.
Let a collection (uS)SµN be a group pro…le. If all coalitions have complete prefer-
ences, then let (uS)SµN be a valid group pro…le. Suppose that (ui)i2N is a degenerate
individual pro…le. We can use (15) to compute an invalid group pro…le (uS)SµN, i.e.,
some preference &S may not necessarily be complete. Let (ui;k)i2N be a sequence
26of non-degenerate individual pro…les and (uS;k)SµN the corresponding valid group
pro…le. The construction of the sequence (ui;k)i2N is always possible if m ¸ 3. By
continuity of (15), if (ui;k)i2N ! (ui)i2N, then (uS;k)SµN ! (uS)SµN. The following
Continuity Condition extends our two main results to degenerate domains:
If &S;k is complete and uS;k ! uS; then &S is complete and has utility uS.
Note that this Continuity Condition is not meaningful when the invalid group
pro…le produces uS = 0 for some S µ N. For example, if uS = 0, then consider the
sequence uS;k = u=k, for some u 6= 0. Clearly, uS;k ! uS but &S;k is the non-trivial
preference with utility u, whereas &S is trivial. Thus, &S;k does not converge to &S
in terms of preference.26 Minimal Consensus is a su¢cient condition that eludes this
di¢culty.
5.3 Agents with Trivial Preferences
Regarding the possibility of encompassing agents with trivial preferences, they can
be included if the following precaution is considered: if N¤ is the coalition of agents
with non-trivial preferences, then choose T in Theorem 9 so that N¤ 2 C and TN¤ is
non-degenerate. Similarly, if N¤ is non-degenerate, then Theorem 12 holds.
Both claims are veri…ed by observing that Lemma 6 holds if u1 = 0 and u2 6= 0,
or if u1 = u2 = 0, but fails if u1 6= 0, u3 6= 0, and u2 = 0.
5.4 Masters and Servants
It is interesting to explore a relaxation of Condition (5) in EPR, where agents are
treated in an asymmetric way. An example will be illustrative. Let N = f1;2;3;4g
and T = f12;23;34g. We still impose the weak condition (4) in EPR to all disjoint
coalitions, but now reserve the strong condition (5) to individuals as follows: if 1 ￿
i < j ￿ 4, then
for all x;y 2 M; x Âi y; x %j y ) x Âij y: (19)
26It is illustrative to examine the corresponding preference cones: the preference cones of &S;k are
identical to the half space with normal u 6= 0, but this sequence of cones does not converge to Rm,
the preference cone of the trivial preference &S.
27(19) allows for i < j to prevail over j in the bilateral agreement &ij, i.e., to have
uij = ui, or ±i;j = 0. We may think of i as a master and j as i’s servant. For example,
let ±2;3 = 0 and ±i;j = 1 for all other pairs in T so that 2 dominates 3. Noting that
Lemma 6 encompasses u23 = u2 whenever u34 6= u4, we …nd that EPR produces
that both 1 and 2 dominate 3 and 4. Thus, if we require completeness of the pair
preference as in Theorem 12, then we obtain that EPR implies the following utilities
u13 = u14 = u134 = u1;
u23 = u24 = u234 = u2; and
u123 = u124 = u1234 = u12:
Taking 1 as base agent, Formula (14) gives ¸1 = ¸2 = 1 and ¸3 = ¸4 = 0, which
produces the correct utilities for all coalitions except for u34 = (u3 +u4)=2 6= 0. This
calls for the following modi…cation in the procedure to compute a given uS: choose a
base agent in S who is undominated in S, and compute ¸i;S as in (14) for all i 2 S.














The example could be extended as follows. First we establish a relation of domi-
nance between pairs of agents, assumed irre‡exive and acyclic. Then we impose (19)
to all pairs i and j such that i dominate j. The application of EPR after assuming
complete preferences for all the pairs produces complete preferences for all coalitions,
with utilities computed as in (20). The set of agents divides itself in hierarchical
classes of masters and servants, with ¸i;S = 0 if S contains some agent whose class is
higher than i’s, and ¸i;S > 0 otherwise.
6 Extensions
We assumed a …nite-dimensional prospect space for reasons for simplicity. The ex-
tension to in…nite-dimensional spaces is quite direct, if we bear in mind that the
preliminary section of Baucells and Shapley (1998) articulates the theory of incom-
plete preferences in such large spaces. One also imagines the extension to countably
many agents once the natural de…nitions using limits are in place. More challeng-
ing seems the extension to uncountably many non-atomic agents, as Aumann and
Shapley (1974) accomplished in the context of cooperative game theory.
28In the interpretation of cardinal utility as strength of preference, we want coali-
tions to aggregate individual strength of preferences.27 Thus, it is convenient to
develop the theory of incomplete strength of preference. In Alt (1971) and Shapley
(1974) strengthofpreferenceisde…ned as abinary relationoverpairs ofprospectsthat
is superimposed on some ordinal preference relation over prospects. Under suitable
axioms, one …nds a unique cardinal representation of the originally ordinal prefer-
ence that does not involve lotteries. Moreover, the strength of preference relation is
represented by utility di¤erences. With this in mind, one could introduce a binary
relation over pairs, (x;y)1 &12 (z;w)2, as the basis to express interpersonal compar-
isons of strength of preference. Such a relation could be incomplete, and hopefully
represented by a cone of utility functions Uij µ Coi;j. Thus, a cardinal framework for
group utility may be obtained without involving lotteries.
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27See Elster and Roemer (1991) for a collection of articles on interpersonal comparisons of welfare.
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